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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL RULE 23(b) (3) (D): The Manageability Requirement
In The Treble Damage Consumer Class Action
City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co.'
The adoption of the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure led to extensive changes in many areas of the law.2
This was especially true of the amendment of rule 23 dealing with class
actions. Although the new rule was designed to correct many of the
ambiguities in its predecessor,3 its requirements have spawned new
controversy when considered in the complexity of a civil antitrust suit."
An initial question posed by the new rules was whether an antitrust
class action, in which each consumer's damage was unique, would
satisfy the requirement that questions common to the class as a whole
should predominate over those questions peculiar to individual class
1. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
2. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
3. Id. at 375-400.
4. See generally Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innova-
tions in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1971) ; Note, The Use of Federal Rule 23 in Private Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 949 (1969).
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members.5 This question was answered in the consumers' favor by
allowing the issue of whether there was a conspiracy to lessen competi-
tion to constitute a predominant common question.6 Another problem
was determining what was necessary to satisfy the notice requirement
of rule 23 (c) (2).' This problem, too, was alleviated by allowing a com-
bination of individual notice by mail and general notice by publication.'
In City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co.,' a district court was
faced with interpreting manageability,'" a further requirement of rule
23. The court considered a motion for class certification" in three
treble damage suits based on section 4 of the Clayton Act'2 and
stemming from a series of 1965 indictments charging the defendants 3
with violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' 4 The first
class was to be made up of all state and municipal governments,
agencies, commissions and subdivisions and all general consumers in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware who had purchased gasoline
for their own use between 1955 and 1965. A second suit sought to
provide class representation for all individuals, partnerships and cor-
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) provides: "An action may be maintained as a
class action if . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members ....
6. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452(E.D. Pa. 1968) ; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c) (2) provides in pertinent part: "In any class action
maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
8. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Comment, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) - The Notice
Requirement, 29 MD. L. Rxv. 139 (1969).
9. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (3) (D) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that . . . a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include . . . (D) the difficulties likely to be en-
countered in the management of a class action.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1) provides: "As soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
12. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
13. The right of consumer plaintiffs to sue the gasoline producer rather than
the consumer's immediate retailer involves complex problems of standing and the
"passing on" defense, which are beyond the scope of this note. See Klingsberg,
Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing to Sue and
Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351, 365-68
(1971) ; Wright, Legal Cause in Treble Damage Actions Under the Clayton Act,
27 MD. L. REV. 275 (1967).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). The indictments charged the defendants with
unlawfully combining and conspiring to raise and fix the price of both tank wagon
and retail gasoline. The defendants pled nolo contendere and fines were imposed.
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porations in the same geographic area who had been injured as a
result of purchasing gasoline in tank wagon quantities for their own
consumption. This class was to be represented by McCloskey and
Company, a large contracting firm. In the third suit, the Yellow Cab
Company of Philadelphia sought to represent a class consisting of all
individuals, partnerships and corporations in the same area who had
engaged in taxicab, limousine or related services. The latter two classes
specifically excluded representation of any governmental entities.
After reviewing all three classes in terms of the requirements of
rule 23, the court certified both the McCloskey and Yellow Cab classes
and further subdivided the Philadelphia-New Jersey class into govern-
mental and nongovernmental users.'5 The governmental class was
certified and the nongovernmental class was then further subdivided
into tank quantity and non-tank quantity users. The court considered
the tank quantity users already included in the McCloskey class. How-
ever, it found that the class composed of the non-tank users - the
general retail consumers of gasoline - was unmanageable and, as such,
not certifiable.
The decision of the court not to certify was not based on the
unwieldy size of the consumer class, estimated conservatively at over
six million members, nor on the obvious problem of providing notice
to that many individuals. Instead the court stated that it could not
envision an acceptable method of administering any damage fund
awarded to the class as a whole. According to the court, the great
majority of class members would have no way of proving the amounts
of gasoline purchased during the period in question. The decision not
to certify could have a significant effect on the emerging use of the
consumer class action in antitrust enforcement.
I.
Criminal penalties provided by federal antitrust statutes leave
much to be desired in the way of effective -enforcement. The Sherman
Act provides that a violator "shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year. or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."'" Penalties
of $5,000 or one year imprisonment or both are also available against
individual directors, officers or agents of the violating corporation.
17
Not only are these fines often of minimal economic impact, in light of the
massive finances of the modern corporation, but they are also rarely
levied.' In the early 1960's, some of the nation's leading producers
of electrical equipment were charged with violations of the Sherman
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) (B) provides in part: "a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule
shall then be construed and applied accordingly."
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970). The fines were increased from $5000 in 1955.
Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (1955).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
18. See generally Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal Antitrust
Laws, 45 TEXAs L. Rav. 1301 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Flynn].
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Act.19 Twenty-nine corporations were found guilty of engaging in a
price-fixing conspiracy which according to one estimate involved
approximately 1.7 billion dollars in sales; yet the resulting corporate
fines amounted to only $1,721,000, with individual fines totalling only
$136,000 and thirty-one thirty-day jail sentences, twenty-four of which
were suspended.2 0 The result of such actions is that possible gains to
the violator usually far outweigh any losses in governmental fines.2
The limited deterrent effect of criminal sanctions has thus generated a
need for the private suit in antitrust enforcement.2 2 This need was
apparently recognized by Congress which enacted section 5(a) 23 of
the Clayton Act, allowing private litigants the use of governmental
final decrees or judgments against the defendants as prima facie
evidence of guilt in private actions.
II.
Consumer class actions are not possible in many areas of federal
law, because of the requirement that the amount in controversy exceed
$10,000.24 Section 4 of the Clayton Act,2 5 however, specifically allows
private antitrust suits to be maintained without regard to the amount
in controversy. Though permitted, individual treble damage suits may
be unavailable to plaintiffs like those in City of Philadelphia because
of the costs involved.2" Class actions would thus seem to be ideally
19. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Crim. No. 20399 (E.D. Pa., filed
June 22, 1960). See also Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases:
Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621, 622 (1964).
20. See Flynn, supra note 18, at 1319 & n.99 (1967).
21. It has even been said that in some corporations a $50,000 fine under the
Sherman Act has been treated as amounting to no more than a license fee to do
business in America. Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST
L.J. 87 (1966).
22. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
502 (1969), wherein the Court noted: "As the special provision awarding treble
damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates, Congress has encouraged private antitrust
litigation not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but also
to vindicate the important public interest in free competition."
23. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. 16fa) (1970) provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be
prima fade evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought
by any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United
States under section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which saidjudgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees
entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered
in actions under section 15a of this title.
24. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), in which the Supreme Court
ruled that federal jurisdiction is allowed under the class action rules only where
each claimant can allege injury of $10,000 or more without aggregation by multiple
claimants.
25. See note 12 supra.
26. It has been urged that the costs of a private antitrust suit will total an
absolute minimum of $5,000. Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case,
32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 93 (1966). This must be contrasted with the comparatively
small amount of damages suffered by a single consumer. See also Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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suited to such antitrust plaintiffs. The accessibility of the class action
to the consumer in the field of antitrust may, however, be adversely
affected by recent applications of the manageability standard. The lack
of precedent has enabled some courts to base their decisions on whether
to certify classes on their own preexisting philosophies concerning the
most effective and economical use of limited judicial resources.
In support of his refusal to certify the Philadelphia consumer class,
District Court Judge Augelli cited three earlier cases in which large
classes of consumers had been found unmanageable. In Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co.,27 also a gasoline price-fixing suit, Hawaii sought
injunctive relief and damages as the representative of its citizens in
both a class action and a suit in parens patriae. The district court
allowed a modified parens patriae suit but refused to certify the class
action, declaring the proposed class to be unmanageable. 21 In United
Egg Producers v. Bauer International Corp.,29 a New York district
court refused certification to a class comprising all consumers of eggs
in the United States, noting that "[t]he management problems for the
court would be virtually insuperable."3 "
Neither of these cases, however, appears persuasive for the point
asserted in City of Philadelphia. The Ninth Circuit reversed the allow-
ance of the parens patriae suit in Hawaii, noting that the dismissal of
the class action was not appealed and thus not before the court for
determination. The court did seem to indicate, however, that its
reversal of the parens patriae suit was not meant as a prohibition of
the class action. 31 The statement on manageability in United Egg
Producers seems to be pure dictum, as the court actually based its
dismissal of the action on plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue. The
court noted that "[u]ltimate consumers are not within the economic
class with standing to sue in the circumstances shown here, where
the direct injury, if any, falls on the primary buyer in the chain of
distribution and cannot be passed on to the ultimate consumer."3
Another distinguishing feature of United Egg Producers was that the
party seeking the status of representative had an economic interest
that lay with the suppliers and not with the consumers.3
27. 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W. 4246 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1972).
28. 301 F. Supp. at 984 n.3. The conclusion as to unmanageability, rendered
during the district court hearing, is reported in the Supreme Court decision. Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 40 U.S.L.W. 4246, 4247 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1972).
29. 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. Id. at 321.
31. The court of appeals stated:
Hawaii's claim does not constitute an effort to prevent unjust enrichment
by the wrongdoers through recovery by the state, for the affected consumers
or for itself, of the total of direct injuries suffered by persons who are unable
to seek recovery for themselves. Hawaii's claim is over and above all such
recovery by persons, or on behalf of classes, and is asserted to have independent
existence quite apart from such direct injuries.
431 F.2d at 1285.
32. 312 F. Supp. at 321. For a discussion of the modern trend toward liberaliza-
tion of standing requirements see Note, Standing, Ripeness and Bureaucratic Inertia,
31 MD. L. REV. 134 (1971).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3) requires that "[o]ne or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . the claims
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.The court in City of Philadelphia found further, and perhaps more
persuasive, support in the unreported memorandum opinion of Hackett
v. General Host Corp.4 Plaintiff, a consumer of bread who had
purchased from a retail outlet, sought to represent all individual con-
sumers throughout the Philadelphia area who had purchased pan-baked
bread for the use of themselves or their families. Confronted with a
class estimated at six million persons, the court ruled that the problems
of management would be insurmountable and would lead to "many
knotty, complicated and unnecessary problems." 5 Yet just why these
problems were unnecessary is at least questionable, since the consumers
were left remediless by the dismissal of the suit. The value of Hackett
as a precedent is weak, moreover, because the court in that case placed
primary reliance on such authorities as the district court decision in
Hawaii and United Egg Producers, buttressed by a dissenting opinion
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,6 a Second Circuit decision reversing
a district court's dismissal of a securities transaction class action. On
remand of the Eisen case, a class of nearly six million shareholders
was certified.
In citing examples of previous class actions found unmanageable,
the district court in City of Philadelphia conceded that neither the size
of the class nor the complexity of gasoline pricing should alone deter-
mine manageability." Instead the court concluded that "[i]t is readily
apparent that no matter how easy it is to establish damages on a class
level, if it is extremely difficult or almost impossible to distribute these
sums to their rightful recipients, the class is unmanageable." 9
In the most recent decision in the Antibiotic Drug cases,4 ° a series
of private antitrust actions alleging a nationwide conspiracy to fix drug
prices, a district court found a manageability problem present but not
controlling. In its answer to the argument of the defendants that no
class action of that magnitude4' had ever been authorized, the court
noted that the only method open to the plaintiffs by which they might
pursue their claims was that of a class action. It added that "the
or defenses of the representive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class .... "
34. Civil No. 70-364 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1970).
35. Id. at 7.
36. 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
37. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This was an action by an odd-lot investor,
on behalf of himself and all other buyers and sellers of odd lots of securities on the
New York Stock Exchange during the years 1960-1966, against two brokerage firms
for combining and conspiring to monopolize odd-lot trading and for fixing odd-lot
differentials in an excessive amount in violation of the Sherman Act, and against
the Exchange for failing to adopt rules protecting odd-lot investors.
38. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Republic Corp.,
43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
39. 53 F.R.D. at 72 (emphasis added).
40. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in the Antibiotic Antitrust Actions
(Consumer Class Actions Opinion No. 2), 333 F. Supp. 278, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41. It may be noted here that the number six million seems to be a recurrent
figure in many class actions for antitrust violations. In Hackett, Eisen and City of




Court cannot simply close the doors to these litigants because their
actions present novel and difficult questions. Instead the Court and the
parties must use their ingenuity to conduct this litigation in a manner
which will guarantee the rights of both sides." 42 The court also re-
buffed the argument of defendants that the plaintiffs were actually only
seeking a "pot of gold." The court stated that plaintiffs would still
need to prove the price-fixing conspiracy at trial and, if so proved, the
defendants would not be entitled to the "pot of gold" created by their
illegal activities.4" The court in City of Philadelphia took note of this
opinion, but decided that it was dealing with an aspect of the manage-
ability problem not present in the drug litigation, that of individual
class members not being able to claim against any damage fund estab-
lished because they would lack records to substantiate the amounts of
their claims. Judge Augelli recognized that credit card records or
itemized income tax returns would allow some consumers to prove
their damages, but feared that such recoveries would unjustifiably
prejudice the rights of those without records. Moreover, he noted, the
question would remain of what to do with the undistributed damages.44
In a 1969 law review article, the reporter of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules, which drafted the amendments, anticipated the
difficulties that lay ahead in the securing of final relief to class members
and declared that "imagination and even daring may be required of
counsel and courts in devising abbreviated but fair procedures leading
to hand-tailored relief which may well be quite novel in form."4
Perhaps it was in this spirit that the California Supreme Court acted
in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,46 a suit brought by customers of a taxicab
company to recover excessive charges made during a period of more
than four years. The court recognized that, in the absence of a class
suit, the defendant would retain the benefits of its alleged wrongs.
Accordingly, it found preferable a procedure that would permit the
parties claiming injury to recover the amount of their overpayments.
In reversing a lower court's sustaining of a demurrer and remanding
for further proceedings, the court took notice of a suggestion made
by the state of California, as amicus curiae, that the total amount of
overcharges recovered be deposited with the court or its named trustee,
subject to an order that class members presenting adequate proof be
able to obtain a refund of overcharges. At the end of seven years,
the uncollected portion of the deposited monies would be presumed
abandoned and escheat to the state. Such a plan, the state urged, would
ensure that each of the injured parties would recover all of his provable
excess payments and that the defendants would not retain unjustly
acquired profits.47
42. 333 F. Supp. at 289.
43. Id. at 287.
44. The court in the Antibiotic Drug case left open the question of the dis-
tribution of any unclaimed damages. Id. at 288.
45. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 497, 499-500 (1969).
46. 63 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
47. 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738. The court did not decide the merits of
this argument, finding it prematurely raised and within the discretion of the trial
[VOL. XXXI
PHILADELPHIA V. AMERICAN OIL Co.
Another possible solution was formulated in Illinois Bell Telephone
Co. v. Slattery,8 wherein a telephone company was allowed to re-
distribute its own rate overcharges under the supervision of a master.
The Company had argued that it should be allowed to retain any
unclaimed refunds to offset the amount it spent in distributing the
rebates. The court rejected this argument, reminding the Company
that it was responsible for the situation that had made these expendi-
tures necessary.49 The Company still kept part of the fund.5"
Of the two foregoing alternatives, the former may be preferable
in the situation in City of Philadelphia, since it would allow all who
could furnish proof of loss to recover, while not allowing the alleged
wrongdoer to keep the greater portion of his ill-gotten gains. The
method used in the Illinois Bell case, while reducing the court's time
and costs in distributing the fund, still permitted the defendant to
retain a portion of his unjust profits. A court could just as well require
the defendant to reimburse it for the costs of distribution and thereby
increase the deterrent effect.
An even more innovative method of recovery was suggested in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"' a securities transaction class action
brought by approximately six million shareholders. That court's theory,
equally applicable to City of Philadelphia, was that
Distribution of an eventual recovery to the class members in
a case such as this one need not be viewed solely in terms of
personal and individual damages and recoupment thereof. Such
a view is appropriate where the disputed transactions themselves
are personal and individual and have litigable significance to the
plaintiff. The situation here, however, is different. Although
the total volume of transactions is very large, each transaction,
as far as the issues here are concerned, is thoroughly stereotyped
and is sufficiently small so that the benefits of individual recovery
are not worth the price of litigating individual claims.52
Holding the suit maintainable as a class action, the court urged the
plaintiffs to consider some kind of "fluid class recovery" - the
distribution of damages to the class as a whole rather than to individual
class members. Such a recovery had earlier been suggested by a federal
court of appeals in Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission," in which
a Commission order allowing a transit fare increase had been over-
ruled, leaving the problem of how to return a five cents-per-fare over-
court. It should also be noted that this was a state action and thus not controlled by
rule 23. The court did, however, analogize to the Federal Rules.
48. 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939).
49. Id. at 66.
50. The court allowed the unclaimed damages to be retained because the wording
of the original court decree ordering the refunds called for the Company to be
"released," with some exceptions, after a three-year period had elapsed. The court
disallowed a claim by the state of Illinois that it should be allowed the unclaimed
funds on the basis of Bona Vacantia, a common law theory of escheat.
51. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
52. Id. at 264.
53. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
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charge to transit riders. The court ruled that, even though refunds
to the individuals who had paid the increased fare were not feasible,
the amount realized by the transit company from the increase had to
be utilized for the benefit of the class who had paid the overcharges.
Thus the transit company was required to establish a fund equal to
the overcharge - comprising five twenty-fifths of the amount of money
collected as increased fares.54 The court left the disposition of this
special fund to the defendant Commission, "provided such discretion
is exercised consistently with the purpose of benefiting Transit users
in any rate proceedings pending or hereafter instituted. For example,
the fund might be used to cover costs which otherwise might lead to
an increase in fares, or might be used to aid in determining whether
fares should be reduced now or hereafter." 55
Such a fluid recovery might have been utilized in the noted case
by depositing the damage fund with the states to be used in a reduction
of gasoline taxes.56 The reduction would serve as a direct benefit to
some individual members of the class and would generally be in
proportion to the harm suffered by each. Rejecting the possibility of
such recovery, the court determined that since the composition of the
motoring public had changed considerably in the six years since the
alleged price-fixing, any fluid class recovery would be a windfall to
those who had since become gasoline consumers and a deprivation to
those who were entitled to recovery but had left the area.
It must be admitted that this type of recovery when applied to
the facts of this case is an imperfect method of getting the damages to
injured parties, but it seems clear that it is superior to no recovery at
all. The Eisen court appears to have stated the better reasoning: that
emphasizing individual recovery may unduly stress considerations not
totally relevant to the conditions of the case, especially in view of the
small amounts of damages incurred by most class members which,
absent the class action device, would effectively bar any suit.5" To
this, of course, should be added the acknowledged punitive as well as
compensatory aspects of treble damage actions.58
III.
While the restrictive effect of the manageability requirement may
preclude the use of rule 23 by large consumer groups, there may be an
alternative remedy if a recent effort to revitalize governmental parens
patriae5" suits is successful. It has been argued that the technical
54. The fare increase was from twenty cents to twenty-five cents.
55. 318 F.2d at 204.
56. A court's directing a governmental entity to use the damages awarded for
a specific purpose is not unique. The device was used, for example, by the Bebchick
court as the basis for its award. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
57. 52 F.R.D. at 264.
58. See notes 22 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
59. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country" and refers to the
role of the government as sovereign and guardian. The doctrine has often been used
by a state government acting as the guardian of juveniles, the insane or the unknown.
See generally Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens
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problems presented in the use of rule 23 may be bypassed by the use
of such parens patriae suits, viewed as no more than super class
actions." Yet in a 1969 case involving alleged antitrust violations in
the plumbing fixtures business,"' the states of Kansas and California
were denied standing to sue in parens patriae after making just such
an argument. The district court ruled that allowing a state to sue in
such a manner would amount to permitting a class action without the
limitations set out in rule 23. The court added:
the writers of the revised Rule 23 weighed the problems of manage-
ability, fairness, and judicial economy in establishing the require-
ments therein, and the Court agrees with defendants that to allow
a plaintiff State to recover damages for individual claimants in a
substitute type of representative suit without the safeguards there
provided would undermine the aims of that Rule . 2
More recently, however, a district court allowed the state of
California, in California v. Frito Lay Inc., 68 to sue on behalf of its
citizens who, because of lack of records, were unable to prove their
claims and vindicate their rights. The suit, for treble damages under
antitrust laws, was based on an alleged conspiracy to fix the prices of
snack foods. The court noted that, unlike gasoline purchases, where
many credit card holders could substantiate their losses, "[h]ere, the
purchase of snack foods is done largely on a direct cash basis (much
with the dimes and quarters of children) where no receipt is kept by
the consumer. 64 It concluded that "[c]ourts cannot shrink from the
responsibility of providing a forum for litigating claimed violations
of rights - private or public - just because it has never been done
before. Parens patriae in this representative sense meets both the
letter and the spirit of Section 4 of the Clayton Act."6
This effort at revitalization of parens patriae suits was dealt a
blow recently by the United States Supreme Court decision in Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co."6 The district court in that gasoline price-
fixing case, while refusing to certify a class action,67 stated it would
allow a suit in parens patriae for recovery of damages due to eco-
nomic injury, "if defendants' acts have a deleterious impact upon
the general welfare or economy of the state."6 s After a reversal by
Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411, 412 (1970); Note,
Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages
Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. Ruv. 570 (1970).
60. See Wrongs Without Remedy, supra note 59, at 593.
61. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. ff 73,013 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
62. Id. at 87,971.
63. 40 U.S.L.W. 2218 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 1971).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W. 4246 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1972).
67. 301 F. Supp. at 984 n.3.
68. Id. at 987. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on this point. 431
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970). The court ruled that,
1. An injury to the general economy of the state is not an injury to the
business or property of the state or its people. A state can, in its proprietary
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the Ninth Circuit,69 which rejected Hawaii's right to sue in this
manner for damages to its general economy, certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, and held that while
section 4 of the Clayton Act would permit Hawaii to sue in its
proprietary capacity for treble the damages it had suffered from
antitrust violations, "[a] large and ultimately indeterminable part of the
injury to the 'general economy,' as it is measured by economists, is no
more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or property' of
consumers, for which they may recover themselves under § 4."7o The
Court noted the claim of Hawaii that denying the state the right to sue
for injury to her quasi-sovereign interests would allow antitrust
violations to go unremedied since private citizens cannot normally
shoulder the burdens and costs of private suits. It stated, however,
that the earlier district court dismissal of Hawaii's class action was
not intended to rule out the use of the class action by a state suing on
behalf of some or all of its citizens, and in the antitrust area such
suits would be preferred.
CONCLUSION
It is in the spirit of the Antibiotic Drug cases rather than that of
the court in City of Philadelphia that the problems of management in
class actions should be treated. As the rule itself states, manageability
is pertinent to the judicial finding that "a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 17 ' The direct results of the reasoning in City of Phila-
delphia are that those who have been injured by the conspiracy but
cannot prove with certainty the amount of their damages can receive
no relief; those who could prove their damages will not be able to do
so because of the high costs of individual antitrust litigation; and the
price-fixing conspirators will be allowed to keep the greater portion
of their illegally gained profits. A more important indirect result is
that private enforcement of antitrust laws will be greatly impeded. The
search for certainty in judicial proceedings is admirable, but the end
result reached in City of Philadelphia can perhaps better be described
as the "certainty of injustice."7
capacity, engage in business. For injury suffered in these respects a state can
recover under § 4. . .... Such was the basis for Hawaii's Count I. But the
terms "business or property" are to be construed in their ordinary sense; they do
not encompass all pecuniary injury, let alone all manner of damage felt by
a community ...
2. Accepting that the general economy can suffer injury from antitrust
violations, such injury is indirect and consequential to a degree and in a sense
far beyond that usually discussed in this connection. It has long been established
that one whose injury is an incidental or remote consequence of defendant's
violation may not recover under the Clayton Act.
431 F.2d at 1285.
69. 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970).
70. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4250.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (emphasis added).
72. Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 555 (1863).
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In view of the apparent philosophy behind the present rule,7" and
in view of the innovative procedures adopted by other courts dealing
with similar situations, the decision of the court in City of Philadelphia
to seek further amendment of the federal rules and the antitrust laws
seems to lack the "imagination" and "daring" anticipated by the
1966 rulemakers.74
73. "Departing from sound practice, I made an ex parte call to Prof. Ben
Kaplan of Harvard, who, as you know, was the Reporter of the new rules ....
The reasoning, as he told it to me, relates to the fundamental conception that I
have already touched of classes comprised of little people, who don't normally have
much dealing with lawyers or with legal formalities. He got speaking quite pro-
fessorally - and I wrote down what he said - of the class action's 'historic mission
of taking care of the smaller guy."' Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's
Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966).
74. The problem presented in this case may take on added significance to the
Maryland Bar as a result of a Justice Department complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland charging four wholesale bakers in the
Baltimore and Eastern Shore areas of Maryland, Delaware and Virginia with
conspiring to fix and raise the price of bread. The complaint alleged violations in
the Baltimore area since at least December, 1965, and in the Eastern Shore area since
April; 1969. The bakeries involved, with annual sales of nearly $22 million, entered
pleas of nolo contendere on Jan. 11, 1972. United States v. E. H. Koester Bakery Co.,
Criminal Nos. 71-0315, 71-0316 (D. Md., filed July 29, 1971).
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